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Abstract—This paper describes a set of 
experiments with neural network classifiers on the 
MNIST database of digits. The purpose is to 
investigate naïve implementations of redundant 
architectures as a first step towards safe and 
dependable machine learning. We report on a set 
of measurements using the MNIST database which 
ultimately serve to underline the expected 
difficulties in using NN classifiers in safe and 
dependable systems. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Motivation 
The motivation for this body of work is, in the 
context of machine learning (ML) in safe and 
dependable systems, to examine integration of Neural 
Network (NN) classifiers in safe and dependable 
systems.  
Machine learning and safe and dependable systems 
are not mutually exclusive and we have several 
initiatives where we seek to combine the two. The first 
is a high-speed functionally safe machine monitoring 
system where the switch-off, i.e. entry into the safe 
state must occur within 10 microseconds. In such 
systems it is advantageous to anticipate system failure 
and pre-emptively initiate a shut-down to reduce start-
up and repair costs. In a system of 12’000 sensors this 
can almost only be achieved using ML. In this case 
only availability suffers if a faulty prediction is made 
(False Negatives.) 
A second case is compensating for lossy and 
redundant sensors in process control by anticipating 
sensor values. In this application ML can predict what 
the sensors output value could be. In this case the use 
of ML is also non critical - despite a critical process – 
because the output value can be bounded and indeed 
ignored if an a-priori ruleset is compromised. 
The problem with neural networks, specifically 
those utilised as classifiers, is that they are architected 
to produce a best-effort result. In fact most neural 
networks do not feature a default “don’t know” output 
and therefore there are no True Negatives [1]. The 
effect is that the available outcomes are a True Positive 
or a False Positive. We seek to use NN classifiers in 
order to distinguish artefacts that are difficult to 
describe using mathematical models and instead are 
transferred into the probabilistic domain to achieve a 
result that is ultimately based on some abstraction of a 
comparison. The objective is to achieve as many 
matches as possible from uncertain and a priori 
unknown inputs. In functionally safe systems, the 
objective is to avoid dangerous situations which, in 
classification, typically arise from False Positives.  
The novelty we present is a preliminary 
investigation of the application of standard high-
integrity techniques and architectures onto neural 
network classifiers. Typically redundancy and 
diversity techniques are used to gain a definitive 
answer from a number of sensors, calculations and/or 
algorithms diverse or not, where one or more sensors 
or operations may fail. If we allow that NN classifiers 
are ultimately sensors we are faced with a number of 
possibilities, two of which we wish to consider here 
namely same and diverse redundancy. Redundancy is 
often used to ensure that a calculation has been 
performed correctly and to achieve this certainty we 
would consider using two same NN classifiers with the 
same training data. Reproducibility is a minimum 
expectation and can be trivially demonstrated.   
Diversity is often used to avoid common-mode and 
other systematic failures and what we wish to 
investigate is the naive viewpoint that two diverse 
classifiers can be used to confirm the correct 
functioning of the classifier. Redundancy is often 
associated with voting, which is failure masking. 
Diversity in sensors where each sensor outputs a 
systematically different but comparable output, rarely 
use any mathematical voting function more complex 
than an arithmetic or logical function. Indeed, more 
 
 
complex functions generally fall into the category of 
sensor fusion whose objective is another so a research 
question is, how can the outputs of classifiers be voted 
on.   
We approach these challenges in a practical 
pragmatic way by undertaking a set of experiments, 
because of which we dispense with a section on 
previous work, and structure the rest of the paper 
accordingly. In the Section II we describe the 
experiments and in Section III we draw conclusions.                 
II. EXPERIMENTS 
In this section we describe the performance and 
results of a set of experiments investigating standard 
redundancy techniques. As an experimental platform 
we use the FINN library from Xilinx [2] which 
implements the two versions of NN we use, a Fully 
Connected Network (LRC) and the Convolutional 
Neural Network (CVR) as binary neural networks.  
The FINN suite supplies a LRC pre-trained with the 
60’000 28*28 pixel images from the MNIST database 
[3] and we use these as the basis for further 
experiments. For the CVR machine we need to both 
adapt the images to 32*32, which we do by extending 
the border, and re-train the machines. We re-train the 
networks on a GPU cluster provided by a sister 
institute [4] and in order to do so must adapt the setup 
for Singularity rather than the Docker container 
supplied by the FINN repository.  
In order to determine the correctness of the 
classification the test data were compared with the 
results of the classification on a filename basis.  
A. Experiment 1 – Baseline Data     
We re-train the two networks successively with 
60’000 and 1’000 images networks on a GPU cluster 
and present the test set of 10’000 to both.  
Table 1 below shows the True Positive/False 
Positive percentages as well as the classification times 
measured on the PYNQ platform.   
 
Table 1: Baseline of correctly and incorrectly classified images by 
number of training images as well as the classification times per 
variant. W1 standard for 1 weight bit, A1 for one activation bit. 
 LFC 
W1 A1 
LFC 
W1 A2 
CNV 
W1 A1 
CNV 
W1 A2 
CNV 
W2 A2 
60’000 Images      
True Positives 98.4% 98.49% 99.58% 99.51% 99.61% 
False Positives 1.6% 1.51% 0.42% 0.49% 0.39% 
      
1’000 Images      
True Positives - - 95.41% 97.06% 97.26% 
False Positives - - 4.59% 2.94% 2.74% 
      
Classification Time 8 us 8 us 328 us 328 us 1161 us 
 
The results for the LFC possess less meaning than 
one might hope. The output is a binary vector, that is 
a 10 bit vector representing the digits (0 ... 9) where 
one index has logical value “1” and the rest logical 
value “0.” This decision is made in the interface 
between the HW classifier and the SW output module 
on the basis of first highest value. That is if two digits 
are identified with the same probability, the earlier 
digit is chosen. This issue is also possible, albeit less 
likely given the bit-size of the weighting produced by 
the CNV. In order to assess the likely impact, we 
examined the occurrence of the same weight for each 
image from the test data set. As the results show for 
the three CNV configurations trained with 60’000 
images, there are no occurrences of two or more 
weights being equal (Table 2.)  
 
Table 2: Number of equal weights output by CNV configurations 
trained with different numbers of training data 
 CNV W1A1 CNV W1A2 CNV W2A2 
Trained 
part 
1’000 60’000  1’000  60’000  1’000  60’000  
Equal 
Weightings  
8 0  6  0  3  0  
 
As previously mentioned, the fundamentally 
serious issue is that there is no possibility to categorise 
Negatives, a not recognised image. A False Positive 
is, in terms of functional safety, a dangerous failure. 
We test the static reproducibility of the networks. 
That is we present the same image to the trained 
network 10’000 times and our expectation that the 
same result – for the CNV network that all the 
weightings are equal every time - is achieved, is 
validated. Whilst this test does not verify that the NN 
does not possess internal states it does help show that 
these states does not necessarily affect the output.  
We also test the reproducibility of the networks in 
that we change the order of presentation of training 
data. The training machine receives labelled data in a 
single file of ubyte format and presents this data to the 
training implementation which calculates the 
convolution matrixes on an epoch by epoch basis. Our 
expectation is that the order of data presentation to the 
training algorithm does not affect the output, an 
expectation validated by this experiment.  
B. Experiment 2 Logical Voting 
As previously stated, voting serves to mask errors 
and here we investigate the output of parallel. The 
general 2-out-of-2 (2oo2) architecture is shown in 
Figure 1 below. As previously explained there are two 
forms. In the first form, Neural Network 1 and Neural 
Network 2 are identical. For each input they should 
output an identical value and the voter’s task is to 
confirm that this is the case. The redundancy serves to 
verify that the classification was carried out correctly. 
Having shown that the reproducibility of the neural 
networks under test is given, we eschew an 
experiment with two similar neural networks, as we 
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do not expect to observe anything but random errors, 
specifically Single Event Upsets (SEUs) rooted in 
environmental action on the HW.  
We therefore focus on diversity in implementation 
where Neural Network 1 and Neural Network 2 
(Figure 1) differ in some fashion. This configuration 
reduces the scope for systematic errors, often at the 
expense of voter simplicity. 
The act of voting in this configuration expands the 
possible outputs. Outputs are either a Positive or an 
Undecided, the latter being that the two networks 
disagree. 
 
Figure 1: General pattern of a physical redundant system 
 
In the case of Positives, post-hoc investigation can 
then reveal whether the Positive was either correctly 
or falsely identified. There are therefore three 
mutually exclusive output data sets. The set of True 
Positives, the set of False Positives and the Set of 
Undecideds. These three sets are listed in Table 3, 
Table 4 and Table 5 below. In this experiment we 
might (naively) expect that the value for True 
Positives defaults to the lowest value of the two neural 
networks. This would indicate that the other neural 
network recognises a super-set of the first. This is 
unfortunately not the case, each NN recognises a 
subset of the other as a True Positive. The issue now 
becomes either a philosophical question with regards 
to the meaning of ground truth or an exercise in fully 
probabilistic design. Neither bode well for 
functionally safe systems.  
 
Table 3: True Positive rates for logic voting for the two NNs with 
differing weights (W) and Activation (A) bits. The fields with grey 
background are values gained from Experiment 1. The outlined box 
is referred to in Table 6 further below.  
 LFC 
W1A1 
LFC 
W1A2 
CNV 
W1A1 
CNV 
W1A2 
CNV 
W2A2 
LFC 
W1A1 
98,40 %  98,15 %  98,23 %  98,22 %  98,24 %  
LFC 
W1A2 
98,15 %  98,49 %  98,31 %  98,29 %  98,34 %  
CNV 
W1A1 
98,23 %  98,31 %  99,58 %  99,33 %  99,46 %  
CNV 
W1A2 
98,22 %  98,29 %  99,33 %  99,51 %  99,38 %  
CNV 
W2A2 
98,24 %  98,34 %  99,46 %  99,38 %  99,61 %  
Table 4: False Positive rates for logic voting for the two NNs with 
differing weights (W) and Activation (A) bits. The fields with grey 
background are values gained from Experiment 1. 
 LFC W1A1 
LFC 
W1A2 
CNV 
W1A1 
CNV 
W1A2 
CNV 
W2A2 
LFC 
W1A1 
1,60 %  1,12 %  0,19 %  0,25 %  0,22 %  
LFC 
W1A2 
1,12 %  1,51 %  0,17 %  0,23 %  0,22 %  
CNV 
W1A1 
0,19 %  0,17 %  0,42 %  0,21 %  0,24 %  
CNV 
W1A2 
0,25 %  0,23 %  0,21 %  0,49 %  0,25 %  
CNV 
W2A2 
0,22 %  0,22 %  0,24 %  0,25 %  0,39 %  
 
Table 5: Undecided rates for logic voting for the two NNs with 
differing weights (W) and Activation (A) bits.  
 LFC 
W1A1 
LFC 
W1A2 
CNV 
W1A1 
CNV 
W1A2 
CNV 
W2A2 
LFC 
W1A1 
- 0,73 %  1,58 %  1,53 %  1,54 %  
LFC 
W1A2 
0,73 % - 1,52 %  1,48 %  1,44 %  
CNV 
W1A1 
1,58 %  1,52 %  -  0,46%  0,30%  
CNV 
W1A2 
1,53 %  1,48 %  0,46%  -  0,37%  
CNV 
W2A2 
1,54 %  1,44 %  0,30%  0,37%  -  
 
C. Experiment 3 Arithmetic Voting 
As previously pointed out the standard output of 
the LFC is a binary vector so redundancy can only 
converge to a True/False output. The CNV can output 
a weight and two weights can be arithmetically 
connected together to produce a stronger predicate. 
We investigate two forms of redundancy here firstly 
the case of two CNV networks with different 
activation and weight bits and two CNV networks 
with the same number of activation and weight bits but 
different training sets.    
 
1) Experiment 3a - Diversity in CNV 
Weightings/Activations  
 
By simple addition of two weighted outputs of two 
diverse CVNs we may (naively) expect an 
improvement on the diversity with logical voting. This 
form of voting will however only grant us two 
possible results, True and False Positives. The table 
below Table 6 therefore only notes the True Positives 
and is the result of addition of the output weights. 
From the results and comparing with the heavy 
bordered box from Table 3 we can see that there is a 
definite improvement in True Positives. Given that we 
do not really understand the behaviour of Experiment 
2 because we do not understand the relationship 
between True and False positives, we consider this 
result to be of secondary importance.  
 
 
Table 6: True Positive rates for arithmetic voting for the two NNs 
with differing weights (W) and Activation (A) bits. The fields with 
grey background are values gained from Experiment 1. The values 
can be compared with the outlined box in Table 2. We note, for 
instance, an improvement of 0.3% in True Positives between 
Logical and Arithmetic voting for the CNVA1W1 and CNV W1A2 
(diverse) configuration.   
 CNV 
W1A1 
CNV 
W1A2 
CNV 
W2A2 
CNV 
W1A1 
99,58 %  99,63 %  99,63 %  
CNV 
W1A2 
99,63 %  99,51 %  99,66 %  
CNV 
W2A2 
99,63 %  99,66 %  99,61 %  
     
2) Experiment 3b – Diversity of training 
In this experiment we train the same NN networks 
with a diverse training set. Specifically we split the 
training set in two sets of 30’000 images each, train 
two same CVN networks, present the networks with 
the test set and note the results (Table 7.) We learn that 
the True Positives come very close to that of the 
networks trained with all 60’000 training images. As 
the table shows, the True Positive rates of the single 
networks are weaker. We feel that this result indicates 
a path forward using unmodified NN architectures  
 
Table 7: Individual True Positive rates for diversely trained (30’000 
images each) same networks also compared with arithmetically 
combined; voted True Positive rates compared with True Positive 
Rates from Experiment 1.  
 CNV W1A1 CNV W1A2 CNV W2A2 
Trained 
part 
1/2  2/2  1/2  2/2  1/2  2/2  
True 
Positive 
Rate  
99,42% 99,56%  99,41%  99,44%  99,45%  99,3%  
True 
Positives 
99.57% 99.50% 99.57% 
True 
Positive 
Rate 
Experiment 
1 
99.58% 99.51% 99.61% 
 
D. Applying Thresholds 
By measuring the distance between a likely correct 
classification and the next-best-fit, we achieve some 
sort of confidence factor and if we use that confidence 
factor as a threshold we can also map the output of a 
NN to True Positives and Uncertains. In an attempt to 
evaluate a useful threshold size we tracked the 
threshold size against True/False Positives and 
Uncertains, the results are shown in Figure 2. The 
diagram shows a marginal reduction in False Positives 
at the cost of an increase in Uncertains. The one False 
Positive-crossing threshold is different for every CNV 
parametrisation.   
 
 
Figure 2: Log plot of True Positives, False Positives and Uncertains 
against thresholds for the CNV parametrized with one activation 
and one weight bit. 
E. Experiment 4 - Temporal Redundancy 
Neural network classifiers are generally stateless, 
that is classifications have no memory. Temporal 
redundancy, running the same algorithm twice on the 
same input data, is another technique to ensure that the 
algorithm is performed correctly. Diversity in 
implementations are also common, again used to 
avoid systematic errors in the implementation.  
F. Experiment 5  - Data Redundancy 
In a similar but different vein, a diverse input, that is 
two versions of the same image for instance possibly 
with changed X-Y position, rotated or different 
lighting, may possibly be used to generate a True 
Positive or Uncertain out of an otherwise potential 
False Positive. We conduct two general experiments 
on rotation. The first examines the effect of variations 
on True Positives, the second on False Positives. 
shows the rotation of a True Positive image of the digit 
8 which is broadly representative of the remaining 
digits in that rotations plus minus 10 degrees 
generally, but not exclusively, make no difference to 
the prospects of recognition by a trained (in this case 
CNV W1A1) network. 
 
 
Figure 3: CNV recognition of the digit 8 rotated through 360°. Blue 
indicates recognized digit. 
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What is arguably more interesting is whether, for 
instance, rotating those digits that are not recognised 
by a trained network will improve recognition 
chances. From Experiment 1, there are 11 images of 
the number 8 that are not recognised. We take those 
11 images and rotate them in one degree steps through 
360°, passing them individually through the CNV 
network. Figure 4 shows us recognition rates of 
images that are rotated by the degrees that are noted 
on the X-axis. After rotation to some degree, all digits 
can be recognised some of the time, there are no False 
Positives detected any more. What the figure tells us, 
for instance, is that 10 images of the digit 8 could be 
recognised when rotated by ca. 340°. It does not tell 
us the distribution of possible rotations for a specific 
digit. 
 
 
Figure 4: Recognition of previously unrecognised images of the 
digit 8 by degree of rotation  
 
Figure 5 below shows us the recognition for 
a single exemplary image of the digit 8 is rotated 
through 360°.  
  
Figure 5: Recognition of a previously unrecognised digit 8 through 
rotation. Blue denotes recognised digit. 
III. DISCUSSION 
       We must again re-iterated that we must be careful 
not to confuse concepts. Utilising redundancy is a 
technique for dependability leading to high integrity 
operation. Redundancy is in its usual sense, applied on 
units of known operation models, for instance 
temperature sensors whose operation is well 
understood or processors where the code has been 
vetted. The issue with neural network classifiers is that 
the model enacted on the neural network is generally 
not well understood, if at all and highly susceptible to 
bias. While we can expect a redundant execution, 
under error-free conditions, of a neural network 
classifier to produce the same result, the reaction of 
the redundant execution with respect to a broad set of 
input-data is indeterminate and may produce 
dangerous operational situations. A large part of this 
problem is caused by an inability, with current 
classifier architectures, to put precise bounds on the 
training data that allow prediction of results.  
This paper examines the question of redundancy as 
a technique to reduce the potential for dangerous 
operations, with limited success. The value of this 
paper lies in the discussion of some safety and 
dependability issues which may help trigger a more 
theoretical discussion on the use of NN classifiers in 
functionally safe systems.  
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